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Message Text

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61
ORIGIN MBFR-03

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 SS-15 NSC-10 ACDA-19 DODE-00

USIE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 OIC-04 AEC-11 CIAE-00

PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01

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S/S - MR. GAMMON
---------- 125409
O R 030056Z AUG 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

S E C R E T STATE 152826

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: GUIDANCE FOR AUGUST 3 NAC DISCUSSION OF UK JULY 30 PAPER

1. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS IN PRESENTING US REACTION TO UK JULY 30 PAPER IN COUNCIL MEETING AUGUST 3. FYI. SOME OF THESE POINTS WERE MADE TO DEFMIN CARRINGTON DURING WASHINGTON VISIT AUGUST 1. IF POSSIBLE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO REVIEW OUR POINTS WITH THOMSON PRIOR
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TO NAC MEETING, STRESSING TO HIM OUR DESIRE TO AVOID UNPRODUCTIVE US-UK DISPUTE OVER FORMULATION OF AGREED ALLIED NEGOTIATING GUIDANCE. AT THE SAME TIME YOU SHOULD POINT OUT OUR DISAGREEMENTS WITH MANY POINTS PARTICULARLY UK RELUC-

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TANCE FOR ALLIES TO REACH PRE-NEGOTIATION DECISION ON RE-
DUCTION APPROACH. DURING DRAFTING OF ALLIED PAPER, MISSION
IS REQUESTED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THOMSON TO LIMIT DAMAGE
FROM UK HANGING BACK. END FYI.
2. THE UK PAPER IS A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIANCE
TASK OF DEVELOPING AN AGREED NEGOTIATING POSITION OVER
COMING WEEKS. AS A CRITIQUE OF OUR APRIL 30 SUBMISSION, IT
MAKES A NUMBER OF POINTS WHICH HAD ALREADY OCCURRED TO US IN
REVIEWING THAT SUBMISSION IN LIGHT OF ALLIED VIEWS, AND
WHICH WE BELIEVE WERE DEALT WITH IN OUR RECOMMENDATIONS
OF JULY 27. IT WOULD APPEAR TO US THAT THE NEGOTIATING
POSITION WE PROPOSED JULY 27 AND THE UK PAPER ARE CONSIS-
TENT ON SEVERAL GENERAL POINTS, SET FORTH BELOW. WE ARE
CONFIDENT THAT THIS CONSONANCE OF VIEWS WILL BE REFLECTED
IN THE SECTION ON THE ALLIANCE NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL WE HAVE
SUGGESTED THE SPC PREPARE FOR NAC DECISION AS PART OF THE
PAPER ON THE ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR.

A. BOTH UK AND US PAPERS AGREE THAT WE MUST GIVE
PRIORITY ATTENTION TO MITIGATION OF THE ASYMMETRIES IN
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEY AGREE
THAT WE MUST FOCUS ON THE THREATENING FORCE ELEMENTS AND
THE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF THE OTHER SIDE, THAT A COMMON
CEILING OR PARITY IS A PROPER WESTERN GOAL IN MBFR, AND
THAT AGREED PROVISIONS ON DISPOSITION OF EQUIPMENT OF
WITHDRAWN FORCES SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF ASYMMETRIES IN
REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY.

B. THE TWO PAPERS ALSO AGREE THAT INITIAL REDUCTIONS
SHOULD BE LIMITED TO SOVIET AND US FORCES IN THE GUIDELINES
AREA, AND THAT OTHER NATO FORCES, ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT BE
MENTIONED IN AN INITIAL AGREEMENT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED
ONLY LATER, WITHOUT DRAWING DISTINCTIONS AMONG THEM AND
WITHOUT SETTING UP A SPECIAL ZONE IN EUROPE.

C. MOREOVER, THE TWO PAPERS AGREE THAT ALTHOUGH A
SUBSEQUENT PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE MENTIONED, ITS
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COMPOSITION SHOULD NOT BE DEFINED; THAT THE ALLIANCE
NEGOTIATING POSITION SHOULD BE CONFIGURED TO MINIMIZE
THE EFFECTS OF INEVITABLE DATA UNCERTAINTIES, AND THAT
WE MUST ATTEMPT TO DRAW THE SOVIETS OUT IN THE EARLY
STAGES OF NEGOTIATION.

D. IN OUR VIEW, THIS MEASURE OF AGREEMENT, PLUS THE
FACT THAT THE EXCELLENT BELGIAN PAPER ALSO PARALLELS
THESE VIEWS, PROVIDES A GOOD BASIS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF AN
AGREED ALLIED NEGOTIATING APPROACH OVER THE NEXT WEEKS.

3. AT THE SAME TIME, THE UK PAPER RAISES A NUMBER OF
QUESTIONS ON WHICH WE WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION.

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4. FIRST, THE UK PAPER ADVANCES THE CONCEPT THAT REDUCTIONS OF TEN PERCENT IN OVERALL NATO MANPOWER IN THE GUIDELINES AREA, AS ENVISAGED IN THE GUIDELINES PAPER, COULD IMPAIR THE WEST;S ABILITY TO CARRY OUT AGREED ALLIANCE STRATEGY, AND THAT REDUCTIONS OF GREATER THAN TEN PERCENT IN US MANPOWER ONLY COULD HAVE THE SAME EFFECT. THE FIRST CONCLUSION DOES NOT APPEAR TO AGREE WITH THE JOINT ASSESSMENT OF THE ALLIANCE, REFLECTED IN THE AGREED GUIDELINES, THAT A TEN PERCENT CUT IN NATO GROUND FORCES IS ACCEPTABLE IF MATCHED BY ADEQUATE PACT REDUCTIONS. AS REGARDS US FORCES, AS WE HAVE STATED, WE CONSIDER THAT A

REDUCTION APPROACH LIMITED TO WITHDRAWAL OF TEN PERCENT OF US AND SOVIET GROUND PERSONNEL QUOTE HAS THE WEAKNESS OF NOT CONTAINING ANY BROADER EXPLANATION OR RATIONALE MAKING THE PROPOSAL CONVINCING TO PUBLIC OPINION, NO PROVISION FOR A FOLLOW-ON PHASE AND NO SELF-EVIDENT REASON WHY THE REDUCTION IS SET AT TEN PERCENT AND NOT HIGHER. IT THUS WOULD LEAVE US PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSALS FOR A MUCH HIGHER PERCENTAGE REDUCTION OR TO SOVIET EFFORTS TO APPLY THE TEN PERCENT CUT TO ALL NATO FORCES ACROSS THE BOARD. END QUOTE.

5. MOREOVER, THE UK APPROACH IS NOT IN OUR VIEW TOUGH AND DEMANDING ENOUGH ON THE SOVIETS, COMPARED WITH THE APPROACH WE RECOMMENDED JULY 27. OUR APPROACH CALLS ON THE SOVIETS TO REDUCE 23,000 MORE MEN THAT THE UK APPROACH

AND TO WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY. IT IS TRUE THAT UNDER OUR PROPOSAL THE US WOULD ALSO WITHDRAW 9,000-10,000 MORE SOLDIERS THAN UNDER THE UK APPROACH. THIS, HOWEVER, MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST THE MUCH GREATER SOVIET REDUCTION CALLED FOR IN OUR APPROACH AND AGAINST THE FACT THAT OUR APPROACH SPECIFIES WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY, BUT WOULD LEAVE THE US FREE TO DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION OF ITS REDUCTIONS AND ISPOSITION OF THEIR EQUIPMENT, THUS PERMITTING US TO MAINTAIN NATO COMBAT CAPABILITY. HENCE, WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT OUR APPROACH WOULD DAMAGE THE OVERALL MILITARY BALANCE. ON THE CONTRARY, WE CONSIDER IT MORE ADVANTAGEOUS IN THIS REGARD THAN THE PROPOSAL SUGGESTED BY THE UK.

6. THIRD, THE UK HAS SUGGESTED THAT COMBAT CAPABILITY BE EXAMINED AS A POTENTIAL CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS. LIKE THE UK, WE BELIEVE THAT ALLIED REDUCTION PROPOSALS SHOULD BE JUDGED IN TERMS OF COMBAT CAPABILITY AS WELL AS MANPOWER. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD SEEK REDUCTION OF SOVIET COMBAT CAPABILITY AS A PRIORITY OBJECTIVE. THE RECOMMENDED US NEGOTIATING APPROACH SUBMITTED JULY 27 IS BASED IN PART UPON THIS PREMISE. AS

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NOTED ABOVE, ONE DEFICIENCY WE SEE IN THE UK APPROACH TO SIZE OF REDUCTIONS IS THAT IT WOULD NOT PROVIDE A RATIONAL BASIS FOR DEMANDING WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY. THUS, THE UK AND US PAPERS AGREE THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD SEEK TO MAINTAIN WESTERN COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS WHILE REDUCING SOVIET COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE MOST WOULD CONSIDER THAT TO SEEK AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST AS REGARDS EQUIVALENCE OF COMBAT CAPABILITY IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE A BLIND ALLEY. FOR THIS REASON, ALTHOUGH WE ARE AWARE OF THE LIMITATIONS INVOLVED IN USING MANPOWER AND PROPOSE THAT THE INITIAL SOVIET REDUCTIONS WE SEEK SHOULD BE DEFINED IN TERMS OF A TANK ARMY, WE CONSIDER

THAT MANPOWER WILL REMAIN A BASIC ACCOUNTING UNIT IN MBFR.

7. WITH REGARD TO THE STRATEGY FOR NEGOTIATIONS, WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ALLIES HAVE AN AGREED POSITION AND STRATEGY BEFORE OCTOBER 30. WE HAVE ACCORDINGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE ALLIANCE AGREE TO PRESENT

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TO THE EAST A FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD GIVE AT LEAST THE OUTLINES OF THE CONSTRAINTS, REDUCTIONS, AND VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS THAT WE WILL WANT TO PURSUE. NOT TO HAVE AGREED BEFORE OCTOBER 30 ON A FRAMEWORK APPROACH FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING A REDUCTION COMPONENT, COULD CREATE A CONTINUAL SOURCE OF DIFFICULTY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND MAKE IT NEXT TO IMPOSSIBLE TO CONDUCT THEM IN AN ORDERLY AND PRODUCTIVE WAY. NOR WOULD WE BE IN THE BEST POSITION TO CONVINCE OUR PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLICS THAT WE ARE SERIOUSLY SEEKING AN AGREEMENT.

8. THE US AGREES THAT WE NEED TO EXPLORE SOVIET VIEWS, THAT CERTAIN DECISIONS MUST BE RESERVED, AND THAT WE MUST MAINTAIN BOTH FLEXIBILITY AND CONTROL IN OUR APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. OUR OWN FRAMEWORK APPROACH IS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THESE ENDS. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE BRITISH SUGGESTION THAT THE ALLIANCE CONTENT ITSELF WITH ESTABLISHING GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR ITSELF AND AN EXTENDED EXPLORATION BEFORE ANY PROPOSALS ARE OUTLINED TO THE EAST WOULD LEAVE TOO MUCH UNDECIDED AND UNCERTAIN, OPENING POSSIBILITY OF RECURRENT INTERNAL CONTROVERSY WITHIN ALLIANCE DURING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND CONSEQUENTLY OF ALLIED VULNERABILITY AND WEAKNESS AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. ROGERS

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